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RECENT CASES
BASTARDS - PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY - COMPETENCY OF HUSBAND AND
WIFE TO TESTIFY TO NONACCESS DURING TIME OF CONCEPTION - THE ADMIS-
SIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF BLOOD GROUPING TESTS. - Plaintiff sued defendant to
establish paternity and to provide for support of a child born to plaintiff nine
days after her divorce from her husband. Although plaintiff was separated
from her husband, there was evidence that the husband had visited plaintiff
during the period of conception. Plaintiff testified that defendant was the only
man she had intercourse with during the period of conception, and her hus-
band testified that lie had no intercourse with plaintiff during the period of
conception. Blood grouping tests showed the husband could not have been the
father. The trial court judge instructed the jury that if there was a reasonable
possibility of access between the plaintiff and her husband, the presumption
of legitimacy is conclusive. Plaintiff appealed from an adverse judgment.
The Supreme Court of California held that the presumption of legitimacy can
be rebutted by evidence that showed plaintiff's husband was not the father
and that if in the opinion of experts the blood grouping tests showed that
the husband was not the father, then the rebuttable presumption of legitimacy
is conclusively rebutted. Kusior v. Silver, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960).
The presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock is one of the
strongest known to law.1 In the early days of the law no dispute was allowed,
except in case of husband's impotency, if the husband was within the four
seas of England.2 The common law presumption has been relaxed or modified
and it is now generally held to be rebuttable. 3 There have, however, been
varying statements as to the degrees of proof required to rebut it; e. g., be-
yond a reasonable doubt,4 clear and conclusive proof of nonaccess at the time
the child was begotten, s nonaccess and impotency of the husband, 6 clear and
convincing proof,7 and cohabitation physically impossible. 8 If the child is
born within a reasonable time after the tennination of the marriage, the pre-
sumption of legitimacy will still atpply.0
A majority of jurisdictions, still following the Lord Mansfield rule,1° will
not permit either the husband or the wife to testify that they did not have
1. Morrison v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S.W.2d 100 (1947); Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186
Kan. 605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960); Cameron v. Rowland, £08 La. 663, 23 So.2d 283 (1945);
amith v. Smith, 71 S.D. 305. 24 N.W.2d 8 (1946).
2. See In re Findley, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930).
3. In Kolwalski v. Wojtkowski, 19 N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 6, 17 (1955) the dissenting
judge cites 38 jurisdictions so holding.
4. Ratliff v. Ratliff, 298 Ky. 715, 183 S.W.2d 949 (1944); Sayles v. Sayles, 323
Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948); Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah2d 163, 340 P.2d 761 (1959).
5. Secondine v. Secondine, 311 P.2d 215 (Okl. 1957); Commonwealth v. lacovella, 121
Penn. 139, 182 Atl. 727 (1936); State v. Kellner, 247 Wis. 425, 20 N.W.2d 106 (1945).
6. Jackson v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 267, 66 So.2d 745 (1953); Craven v. Selway, 216
Iowa 505, 246 N.W. 821 (1933); In re Rowe's Estate, 172 Ore. 293, 141 P.2d 832
(1943).
7. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944); Groulx v. Croulx, 98
N.H. 481, 103 A.2d'188 (1954); Smith v. Smith, 71 S.D. 305, 24 N.W.2d 8 (1946).
8. Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So.2d 707 (1956).
9. In re Estate of Julian, 184 Kan. 94, 334 P.2d 432 (1959); Moore v. Smith, 178
Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937); Powell v. State, 84 Ohio 165, 95 N.E. 660 (1911).
10. Expressed in Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowpers 591, 98 Eng. Rep. 1258 (1777) as
"But it is a rule, founded in decency, morality, and policy, that they [husband and wife]
shall not be permitted to say after marriage, that they have had no connection, and there-
fore that the offspring is spurious; more especially the mother, who is the offending party."
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access at the time the child was conceived.i Some courts, because of abroga-
tion of the common law rule by statute 12 or by judicial decision," 3 have allow-
ed the husband and wife to testify as to nonaccess. At least two jurisdictions
hold that a wife may testify but the husband may not,14 and one has held
that the husband can but the wife cannot.'
2
Many states have enacted statutes admitting blood grouping tests to prove
non-paternity. 10 Some jurisdictions now hold that if there is no question as to
their accuracy, these tests are conclusive proof of non-paternity;' 7 while others
hold that the results will be weighed as any other evidence tending to show
non-paternity.'
8
North Dakota holds that the presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable, and
that a husband and wife can testify as to non-access during period of con-
ception. 19 There is no statute in North Dakota authorizing the taking of blood
grouping tests in disputed paternity proceedings or admitting them as
evidence.20
The instant case presents the modern view on the presumption of legiti-
macy in that it allows the husband and the wife to give testimony that would
11. Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 161 So. 549 (1935) (but the wife may testify
to circumstances that infer nonaccess); Shatford v. Shatford, 214 Ark. 612, 217 S.W.2d
917 (1949); Morris v. Morris, 40 Del. 480, 13 A.2d 603 (1940); Craven v. Selway, 216
Iowa 505, 246 N.W. 821 (1933); Dudley's Adm'r v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 240 S.W.2d
76 (Ky. 1951); Hubert v. Cloutier, 135 Me. 230, 194 AtI. 303 (1937); Sayles v. Sayles,
323 Mass. 66, 80 N.E.2d 21 (1948); Zutavern v. Zutavern, 155 Neb. 395, 52 N.W.2d
254 (1952); State v. Sargent, 100 N.H. 29, 118 A.2d 596 (1955); Salas v. Olmos, 47
N.M. 408, 143 P.2d 871 (1943); In re Anonymous, 12 Misc.2d 781, 177 N.Y.S.2d 784
(1958); State v. Campo, 233 N.C. 79, 62 S.E.2d 500 (1950); In re Rowe's Estate, 172
Ore. 293, 141 P.2d 832 (1943); Commonwealth v. Carrasquilla, 191 Pa. Super. 14, 155
A.2d 473 (1959); Peoples National Bank of Greenville v. Manos Brothers, 226 S.C. 257,
84 S.E.2d 857 (1954); Longoria v. Longoria, 324 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
State v. Kellner, 247 Wis. 425, 20 N.W.2d 106 (1945). But cf., 7 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2063, 2064 (3d ed. 1940).
12. Vasquez v. Esquibel, 346 P.2d 293 (Colo. 1959); Peters v. District of Columbia, 84
A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951); State v. Soyka, 181 Minn. 353, 233 N.W. 300 (1930); In re
Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933); Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242,
168 AtI. 840 (1933); In re Kressler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956); In re
Adoption of a Minor, 29 Wash.2d 759, 189 P.2d 458 (1948).
13. Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317 (1937); Yerian v. Brinker, 35 N.E.2d
878 (Ohio App. 1941).
14. People v. Dile, 347 111. 23, 179 N.E. 93 (1931); Bariuan v. Bariuan, 186 Kan.
605, 352 P.2d 29 (1960).
15. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So.2d 163 (1944).
16. Retzger v. Retzger, 161 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1960); Jordan v.. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57
A.2d 209 (1948); Commonwealth v. d'Avella, 162 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1959); Groulx v.
Groulx, 98 N.H. 481, 103 A.2d 188 (1954); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super. 152, 76
A.2d 717 (1950); Schulze v. Schulze, 35 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1942); State v. Clark, 144 Ohio
St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944); Commonwealth v. Cayle, 190 Pa. Super. 509, 154 A.2d
412 (1959); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957). For a
comprehensive coverage of the medical and scientific aspects of the blood grouping tests, see
MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 178 (1st ed. 1954); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 165b (3d ed.
1940); 50 Mich. L. Rev. 582 (1952); 29 N.D.L. Rev. 156 (1953).
17. Retzger v. Retzger, 161 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1960); Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69
A.2d 670 (1949); Commonwealth v. d'Avella, 162 N.E.2d 19 (Mass. 1959); Ross v.
Marx, 21 N.J. Super. 95, 90 A.2d 545 (1952); Foglio v. Foglio, 13 Misc.2d 767, 176
N.Y.S.2d 43 (1958).
18. State v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944); Commonwealth v. Coyle,
190 Pa. Super. 509, 154 A.2d 412 (1959); State v. Brigham, 72 S.D. 278, 33 N.W.2d
285 (1948); Prochnow v. Prochnow, 274 Wis. 491, 80 N.W.2d 278 (1957).
19. State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945).
20. In State v. Eli, 62 N.W.2d 469 (N.D. 1954) the court stated in regards to blood
tests, ".... but if we assume that the court has power in the absence of statute in a proper
case to direct the taking of blood grouping tests, we cannot here determine that the trial
court erred in refusing the defendant's request and denying his motion upon the record
presented."
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bastardize the child, and it advocates making blood grouping tests con-
clusive.
CHARLES R. HUDDLESON.
CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCF - CONTRACTS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
ATTORNEYS - CAN AN ATTORNEY RECOVER ON QUANTUM MERUIT WHEN HIs
CONTRACT OF RETAINER IS CHAMPERTOUS? - Plaintiff, an attorney, was re-
tained by a corporation to prosecute an action for a tax refund. It was agreed
plaintiff's fee was to be contingent and that he would bear the expense of pay-
ing an expert witness whose testimony was necessary for recovery. After plain-
tiff successfully prosecuted the action the client refused to pay his fee, assert-
ing that the agreement for payment of the fee of the witness was champertous.
The Second Circuit Courts of Appeals held that despite the champertous char-
acter of the express contract of retainer, plaintiff could recover the reasonable
value of his services on the theory of quantum meruit. Kamerman v. United
States, 278 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1960).
The decision is contrary to the position taken by the American Law Insti-
tute, which asserts that an attorney who performs services in pursuance of a
champertous agreement can recover neither the compensation stipulated in his
contract of retainer nor their reasonable value.' A substantial body of author-
ity honors this point of view.2  Nevertheless the more widely supported ruling
is in accord with the instant decision and allows the attorney to recover on
the basis of a quantum meruit count. 3 One writer suggests that the variation
in result among the various jurisdictions may be due to "differences in the
specific conduct of the attorneys seeking compensation." 4 Illustrative of the
force of this suggestion is a Virginia court's refusal of recovery on the ground
that what the attorney undertook to do was in itself illegal.5
Other courts have taken a middle ground and hold that the right of re-
covery on the basis of quantum meruit is present but that the void express
contract of retainer cannot be considered for the purpose of determining the
value of the services actually rendered,6 except that it may be used to limit
recovery to the amount set forth in the contract.7 In some instances it has
been stated that the contract is admissible in evidence for the purpose of in-
1. Restatement, Contracts § 545 (1932) "A person who has agreed to render services
under P bargain, illegal under the rules stated in §§ 541, 542 [Champerty and Mainten-
ance], cannot recover either the agreed compensation for his services or their reasonable
value. Nor can he retain from the proceeds acquired by enforcing the claim even reason-
able consideration."
2. Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929); Merland v. National Metropolitan Bank, 84
F.2d 238 (D.D.C. 1936); Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933); Moreland
v. Devenney, 72 Kan. 471, 83 Pac. 1097 (1905); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308,
151 Atl. 542 (1930).
3. Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571 (1923); Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky. 150, 268
S.W. 799 (1925); In re Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82 N.E. 742 (1907); Stearns v. Felker,
28 Wis. 594 (1871). See In re Joslyn, 223 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1955); Darnell v.
Broken Bow, 139 Neb. 844, 299 N.W. 274 (1941).
4. See CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1426 at 712 (1951).
5. Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, '72 S.E. 665 (1911). See also Brush v. City of
Carbondale, 229 Ill. 144, 82 N.E. 252, 255 (1907); Gammons v. Johnson, 69 Minn. 488,
72 N.W. 563, 564 (1897).
6. Elliot v. McClelland, 17 Ala. 206 (1850); Dorr v. Camden, 55 W.Va. 226, 46
S.E. 1014 (1904).
7. Hamilton v. Burgess, 233 Ala. 4, 170 So. 348 (1936); cf. Oxborough v. St. Martin,
169 Minn. 72, 210 N.W. 854 (1926). See Freerks v. Nurnberg, 33 N.D. 587, 157 N.W.
119, 121 (1916).
